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THE TEXAS·CHEROKEE WAR OF 1839
MABILYN McADAMl! SIBLE£

Against the broad background of American history, the Texas-Cherokee
war is only one of many actions by which the Indian was driven from the
land by the white man. The Cherokees have commanded more than the

Indian's usual share of sympathy, however, because of several unusual
circumstances. They were not on their native hunting grounds, but-like
most Texans--were immigrants from the United States. They were semicivilized and had made repeated efforts to secure legal title to their lands.
Furthermore, they claimed as a kinsman Sam Houston, the great war hero
of their antagonists, and it is largely through his eyes that they are viewed
by history. The brief military action in the summer of 1839 contrasts
Houston's Indian policy sharply with that of Lamar, his successor. One
of its interesting aspects is the light it sheds on Houston's enigmatic
character and his curious loyalties to three nations.
When Mirabeau B. Lamar succeeded Houston to the Presidency of
Texas in December 1838, he found the young Republic in a precarious sit-uation. To the south lay a menacing Mexico; to the west were the savage
Plains Indians; and on the northeast the Indian tribes which the United
States had removed from the Southern states overflowed into Texas Bnd
kept the border in a state of alarm. 1 The entire defense problem wal
complicated by the Cherokees and theirtrallied tribes 2 who. occupied an area
in East Texas which was bordered on the east by ('fie Angelina River, on
the west by the Neches River, on the south by the San Antonio road, and
on the north by the Sabine River. The intentions of the Cherokees toward
the Texas Republic were a question mark in the mid-1830's and remain a
question mark to the present time. From the fall of 1835, however, Texans
were haunted by the fear that the Cherokees and their allied tribes would
join a league of Mexicans, Plains Indians, and United States Indians
against the Republic. That fear persisted through the revolution, was
intensified by the Cordova Rebellion of 1888, and finally culminated in the
expulsion of the Cherokees in 1839.
The Cherokees in Texas were descended from a faction of Cherokees
which broke away from the old Cherokee Nation in the latter part of the
eighteenth century. This branch had objected to the encroachment of
Anglo-Americans on Cherokee lands in the southern United States and
removed first to the White River and later to the Arkansas River. AI
Anglo-American settlement increased in the East, other dissatisfied Cherokees joined the branch in the West until by 1819 there were about six
thousand of them west of the Mississippi. 3
In the winter of 1819 1820 J Chief Richard Fields led ahout sixty warriors and a corresponding number of women and children into Texas where
Fields in the name of the tribe laid claim to all the territory north of the
San Antonio road between the Trinity and Sabine rivers. East Texas had
few inhabitants at that time, and Fields invited other members of the
tribe and various friendly tribes to settle in his area. Profiting from the
M
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tribes' previous experience, he immediately began trying to obtain title to
the land from the Spanish government. Apparently he obtained some kind
of promise to land, but the Mexican Revolution against Spain intervened
before the claim was verified. Fields renewed his efforts to obtain title
with the Mexican government. Again he apparently believed that he had
received a promise to the land the tribe occupied, but he did not receive
legal title.
Nevertheless, Fields assumed broad powers. He acknowledged alle~
giance to Mexico but insisted upon the Cherokees' independence of local
authorities. In 1826, partIy due to Fields' influence and partly due to con~
ditions in the United States, there was a sharp increase in Indian immigration from the United States into East Texas. At the same time the
white population showed a similar increase, and the whites began tQ en~
croach on the land the Indians claimed. Fields, angry at Mexican procrastination in issuing land titles to the tribe, joined in the Fredonian Re~
bellion of 1827. His tribesmen did not follow him. After the rebellion failed,
they put him to death and made Bowles their military ohief. 4
Bowles renewed negotiations with the Mexican government for land,
and by 1831 the Mexican general government was so alarmed by the
United States threat to Texas that it looked favorably upon an Indian
buffer state in northeast Texas. The commandant general of the Interior
Provinces directed that the Cherokees be given title to the land they occupied. The political chief at Bexar objected that the Indians were unable
to pay the necessary commissioner and surveyor fees; nevertheless, the
governor of Coahuila and Texas ordered that the families of the Cherokee
tribe be put into individual possession of their lands. Again revolution
intervened before the titles were issued. At the establishment of the Texas
Republic the Cherokees did not have legal title, and their claims had been
infringed upon by several empresarios, including David G. Burnet, who
had issued grants and made surveys in the area.~
Because of widely conflicting estimates, it is impossible to determine
with any degree of accuracy the number of Cherokees in Texas in the mid1830's. The Standing Committee of Indian Affairs of the Texas Senate
estimated on October 12, 1837, that there were two hundred and twenty
Cherokees in northeast Texas, a puzzling estimate that suggests a clerical
error. Houston estimated in 1836 that there were one thousand warriors.
Henry M. Morfit in his report to Andrew Jackson in the summer of 1836
set the figure at about two thousand warriors. 6
On the eve of the Texas Revolution the Anglo-American settlers be~
came apprehensive that the Cherokees and their associated tribes would
assist the Mexicans. The Indians and Mexicans had no real affection for
one another, but they shared a common hostility toward the United States,
and both were violently opposed to the annexation of Texas by the United
States. To counteract the possibility of joint Indian-Mexican action, the
Consultation on November 13, 1835, adopted a motion made by Sam Houston which guaranteed the Indians the right to their lands. Later, on De~
cember 28, the Provisional Government appointed Houston, John Forbes,
and John Cameron as Indian commissioners. They were instructed to
"pursue a course of justice and equity toward the Indians" and "to secure
their effective cooperation."
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Cameron declined to serve as commissioner, but on February 23, 1836,
Houston and Forbes concluded a treaty with the Cherokees which in effect
perpetuated the semi-independent Indian nation in Texas which Fields had
established. The Indians were to be governed by their own laws insofar
as those laws did not conflict with the laws of Texas; The government of
Texas had power to regulate trade between the Indians and others but
no power to levy a tax on the trade of the Indians. Property stolen from
~ettlers or from Indians was to be restored to the injured party, and the
offenders were to be punished by the party to which they belonged. The
Indians were to receive the land they claimed with the provision that
any claims previous to theirs would be respected. The Cherokees and allied
tribes would remain within the boundaries designated by the treaty as
the San Antonio road, the Angelina, the Sabine, and Neches Rivers. No
other tribes would be allowed to settle in this area, and no individual
Indian would be permitted to sell land or white man to buy it. 7
One week after this treaty was negotiated the Provisional Government
of the Republic of Texas was organized with David G. Burnet at its head.
Either because of the press of events 01' because of his own interests,
Burnet showed no inclination to honor the treaty. The Provisional Government did not ratify it, and Burnet seemingly ignored it by his instruc~
tions to Indian Agent M. B. Menard to "avoid with great caution entering
into any specific treaty relating to boundaries."8
The treaty and Houston's role in making it became a controversial
:issue in the Texas Republic. Texans quite properly noted that the treaty
established a sepal'ate Indian state with practical independence within
the boundaries of Texas. The Indians were exempt from taxation by
Texas and would punish their own members for theft from whites. Houston's enemies freely charged that he acted more as a Cherokee than as a
Texan in making the treaty. Certainly the Cherokees had a partial friend
in Houston. He had lived some of his formative years among them, and
had resided only seven miles from Chief Bowles in Tennessee. After scandal ruined his political career in Tennessee, he joined the Indians in Arkansas Territory. According to a rumor which was widely credited at the
time, he first came to Texas on behalf of obtaining land for the Cherokees.
"When this treaty was made . . . Houston was still a Cherokee, if indeed.
he ever renounced that affiliation," said one of his critics. 9 Houston's
critics charged further that he had neglected his duties as commander-in~
chief of the Texas army in his eagerness to assure the Cherokees of their
land.

With Santa Anna advancing, he had left the army at Refugio to

conclude the Cherokee treaty. On the same day that it was signed, Santa
Anna appeared before San Antonio. Thus, the Cherokee treaty was linked
to the Alamo and Goliad in the thinking of Houston's enemies. 1o
Houston heatedly maintained that the treaty kept the Cherokees neutral
while the Texans won their independence, but he was almost alone in this
belief. Even Henderson Yoakum, who usually presents Houston's views,
says that "nothing but the defeat of the Mexicans prevented the Indians
from making an attack upon the settlements."l1 According to popular
belief, the Cherokees had been drawn up in battle array to attack the settlers but had been dissuaded by the victory at San Jacinto and the presence
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of Brigadier General .Edmund P. Gaines in the vicinity of Nacogdoches
with a body of United States troops.12
There is ample justification for this belief. The Indians manifested a
restlessness during the first part of April because of the failure of the
Provisional Government to ratify the Houston-Forbes treaty. Gaines on
the Texas-United States border heard rUmors of a threatened general Indian war. The Committee of Vigilance under Henry Raguet in Nacogdoches received reports that the Cherokees were preparing for war, that
an American trader had been murdered, and that Chief BOWles was stir·
ring up the associated tribes. Gaines learned through an agent that one
Manuel Flores1.3 was among the Indians, urging them to join forces with
the Mexicans. Eugene C. Barker concludes that these reports were highly
exaggerated or deliberately manufactured to bring the United States into
the revolution. Whether or not this is true and whatever the motives of
Andrew Jackson and the secret orders of Edmund P. Gaines, the effect
of these rumors on settlers in the area must not be underestimated. The
rumors of an Indian uprising spread simultaneously with news of the
Alamo and Goliad disasters and contributed to the general panic of the
runaway scrape. The uneasiness generated among settlers at this time
was not allayed until after the Texas-Cherokee War and must be considered a basic cause of that war.
Although Houston was the hero of San Jacinto and was elected President of the Republic by a large majority in September 1836, he never won
popular or official approval of his Cherokee treaty. He sent the treaty
to the Senate on December 20, 1836, with recommendations for its ratification. The Senate took no action on it before Congress adjourned. When
Congress convened in May 1837, the treaty was referred to a committee.
At last, on October 12, 1837, the Standing Committee on Indian Affairs
presented a report on the treaty which turned into a blistering attack on
Houston. By that time Houston's defense policy had outraged the more
vocal element in the Republic for in the face of repeated rumors of a
Mexican invasion he had dissolved the mutinous Texas army j he also had
refused to conduct an aggressive war against Mexico; and in the fact of
continual Indian depredations on the frontier he had insisted on a policy
of conciliation toward the Indians. The Senate Committee ruled that no
Indian tribe had a "vested right of any kind to lands in Texas and that
Houston's treaty was an unwarrantable assumption of authority."B
Houston was incensed at the rejection of his treaty. He then maintained that the treaty was a pledge to the Indians and that it did not require the ratification of the Senate. 1: ; As if to flout the Senate and public
opinion, he stubbornly pursued a policy through his administration of conciliation and peace toward all Indian tribes. His treaties had little effect,
however, and the frontier situation became steadily worse instead of better. "They [Indians] are steeIin and killen all our stock ..• we are in
a bad situation and will no doubt be some of our women and children
rnassaceed the next time you here from us," one embattled settler wrote
the President on March 1, 1837.16
Houston quite properly pointed tp the state of the Republic's finances
as a reason for his policy1? and he blamed United States Indians for the
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atrocities on the frontier. The boundary between the United States and
Texas had not been surveyed, a circumstance which led to innumerable Indian complications. The Indians recently moved into Arkansas by the United
States crossed into Texas to raid or to visit and perhaps reside with their
kinsmen who had settled there earlier. Thus, the northeastern border suf·
fered from Indian depredations, and settlers in the area had an uneasy
feeling that the resident Indian tribes were increasing in population be:::ause of reinforcements from the United States. As it became clear that
the United States planned no immediate annexation of Texas, Texas com~
plaints about United States Indians grew frequent and bitter. These In~
dians could hardly match the savagery of the Comanches, but .letters of
the period bristle with references to United States Indians as though
that were the worst variety.18
By the spring of 1837, the old rumors of an Indian·Mexican conspiracy
were again current. Houston said in his message to Congress on May 5
that he had reliable information that a delegation of twenty "northern
Indians residing on the borders of the United States" had visited Matamoros and had promised the Mexican authorities there three thousand
warriors in the event of a Mexican invasion of Texas.HiI Houston's neat
distinction between Indians residing on the borders of the United States
and those residing within Texas was not generally accepted by Texans.
There was a close relationship between the two groups of Indians, and
the term United States Indians came to mean to most settlers any Indians,
including the Texas Cherokees, who had moved from the Southern states.
Thus, it followed that any conspiracy with Mexico would involve both
groups.
By the fall of 1837 fear of such a conspiracy and dissatisfaction with
Houston's Indian policy were general in East Texas. When the second
Congress convened, Houston's old friend, Thomas J. Rusk, representative
from Nacogdoches, spearheaded a drive for a revision of the militia law
that would effectively remove the militia from the President's control.
Houston vetoed the bill, but it was passed over his veto. The bill provided
that the two houses of Congress would appoint the major general of the
militia. Afte:r; passing the law, the two houses elected Rusk major general.20
The specter of the Indian-Mexican alliance was kept alive in early
1838 by continued Indian atrocities and by the report of Indian Agent
Henry W. Karnes that he was confident such a movement was afoot. 21
The unrest in East Texas erupted in the Cordova Rebellion in August.
On August 4 a group of citizens in search of stolen horses came upon the
trail of a large number of Mexicans. A scout following the trail reported
that there were 8. hundred or more Mexicans encamped near the Angelina
River under the command of Vicente Cordova, a Mexican patriot who had
served as alcalde of Nacogdoches before the revolution and who had joined
in the Texas Revolution as long as it supported the Mexican Constitution
of 1824. The Mexicans sent a letter to Houston disclaiming allegiance to
Texas, and wild rumors were set afloat about their activities. According
to one report, the Mexicans numbered about three hundred and had been
joined by an equal number of Indians. Reports had this body heading
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for the Cherokee country. Rusk immediately called up the militia. He
detached Major Henry W. Augustine with one hundred fifty men to follow Cordova while he marched with about four hundred fifty others toward the village of Bowles. The Mexican group dispersed, and Rusk returned to Nacogdoches without a battle. 22
Houston was in Nacogdoches at this time J insisting on the running of
the survey of the Cherokee land according to his treaty of February 23,
1836. He took issue with Rusk on the matter of calling up the militia
and volunteers, issuing contradictory orders of his own. Rusk, who believed that there was a deep and well laid scheme to involve Texas in
general warfare, ignored Houston's orders, and a deep rift developed
between them. uBis Excellency has acted strangely," Rusk wrote, "indeed
had I been governed by his peremtory [sic] order I have not the least
doubt that an Indian war would have been now raging here but a timely
demonstration of force by marching Six hundred horsemen through their
country excited strongly that which can only be depended upon in Indians
t.heir fear."23
Rusk was strongly backed by public opinion in Nacogdoches. Hugh
McLeod reported that the President "cramped General Rusk in every way
with his orders." Said I. W. Burton, "The President lost ground (if such
a thing is possible) by his conduct on the occasion."H Rusk's position was
strengthened when on August 20, Don Julian Pedro Miracle, a Mexican
liberal, was killed by a citizen in the Red River area. Papers on Miracles'
body gave documentary evidence of Mexican activities among the Indians.
A diary which Miracle had kept of his journey in Texas indicated that he
had visited Mexicans and Indians near Nacogdoches and that he had probably inspired the Cordova Rebellion. He had met with Cordova and with
Bowles, and he carried instructions from General Vicente Filisola urging
the Mexicans and Indians to unite against Texas.2~
Houston clung stubbornly to his defense of the Cherokees. The Cordova Rebellion, he stated publicly, had been brought on by a violation of
the rights of Mexicans and Indians. Indian atrocities thus were caused
by the greediness of land speculators and the activities of surveyors beyond the line of settlement. He advised settlers to stay at home, and in
the heat of a political campaign in 1841 it was charged that when a com
mittee called on him to ask for protection of the frontier, he replied that
"he hoped every man, woman, and child that settled North of the San
Antonio Road would be tomahawked."26
w

Houston continued to insist that only the running of the Cherokee line
according to the treaty· of February 23, 1836, would maintain peace on
the frontier. As his term of office neared its close and as it became evident that President-elect Mirabeau B. Lamar would initiate a radically
different Indian policy, Houston arbitrarily ordered that the Cherokee
line be run. Alexander Horton, in attempting to carry out Houston's instructions, ran into massive resistance from the citizens of East Texas.
"Should the lines between the whites and the Indians not be run by the
20th inst. by orders which I have already issued," Houston wrote Horton
on October 10, 1838, "you will proceed to have the same executed and
for that purpose you will employ a surveyor and take such force as you
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may think proper."
drawn. 2 'l

On the same day he ordered Rusk to have the line

Horton with great difficulty eventually completed the running of the
Cherokee line, but Rusk was operating in complete independence of Sam.
Houston in the fall of 1838. Rusk had no more than disbanded his men
after the Cordova RebeJIion than other Indian incidents caused him again
to call up the militia. In October he made a show of force in Cherokee
territory and defeated the Kickapoos in the Battle of Kickapoo Village.
In November he provoked an international incident by following a group
of Caddoes into Louisiana. By the time Lamar assumed office in December
the East Texas frontier was in a critical state. Rusk was in the Sabine
area with about four hundred volunteers. The Indian and Mexican force
was reported to number about seven hundred. Settlers in the area prepared to leave, and the militia was held in readiness in Nacogdoches to go
to the assistance of Rusk. Kelsey H. Douglass of Nacogdoches wrote the
new secretary of war, Albert Sidney Johnston, for the authority to act
in an emergency without waiting for official orders, which authority was
granted. 28 Thus, the stage was set for a radical change in Texas Indian
policy and for another act in the classic American tragedy of Indian
against white-with the usual results.
Lamar's attitude toward Indians was diametrically opposite to that of
Houston. While Houston had lived as a blood brother to the Cherokees
before coming to Texas, Lamar had been a close associate of Georgia's
Governor George M. Troup in the expulsion of the Indians from that state.
Lamar was not long in making his position concerning Indians clear. In
his first message to Congress on December 21, 1B38, he stated that "the
Emigrant Tribes have no legal or equitable claim to any portion of our
territory." He denied the validity of the Houston-Forbes treaty with the
Cherokees on the grounds that the treaty had never been ratified by any
competent authority. In a later speech he stated his policy even more
dearly. "In my opinion the propel' policy to be pursued toward the barbarian race is absolute expulsion from the country. . . . Our only security
against a savage foe is to allow no security to him."29
The first months of 1839 were marked by additional incidents along
the Red River border and by mounting fear of an Indian-Mexican alliance.
In February seven men were murdered in the Red River area. On the
western frontier James O. Bird, Edward Burlson, John Rice, and John H.
Moore led rangers against the Plains Indians. In the spring two events
in the west brought hostilities to a head in the east. On March 28, Burle~
son met Cordova in a brief engagement. Cordova escaped, but a renegade
white named Robison deserted to Burleson, bringing the infonnation that
Cordova had been to see Chief Bowles in the interest of forming an Indian
league and that Cordova was then on his way to Matamoros for weapons
and supplies for the enterprise. Robison's testimony was suspect because
of his record, but it was accepted by Burleson and the uneasy public.3u
Secretary of War Johnston promptly informed Chief Bowles of Robi.Eon's story and advised him that Iiall intercourse between the friendly
Indians and those at war with Texas must cease!' To enforce this John·
.ston dispatched Major B. C. Waters with a company of six-months men
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to establish a military post all the Grand Saline, a creek in Cherokee territory. When Waters arrived at the Saline, he was warned that any
attempt to establish a post would be repelled by force. Waters did not
have the force to hold the position, so he retired across the river out of
Cherokee territory and advised the government of Bowles' attitude.31
About this time, the second incident ·occurred in the west which affected affairs in East Texas. Lieutenant James O. Rice engaged Manuel
Flores in the Battle on the San Gabriels on May 14, 1839. Flores, together with Cordova, had been one. of the most active Mexican agents
among the Indians. Letters in his effects proved conclusively that he and
Cordova were involved in a conspiracy to incite the Indians. The letters
did not prove, however, that the Cherokees had agreed to co-operate in
the plot. 32
Lamar did not wait for further evidence. "The Cherokees can no
longer remain among us," he decreed. He wrote Bowles a letter stating
bluntly that the Houston-Forbes treaty "was a nullity when made, is inoperative now, had never been sanctioned by this government, and never
will be." He went on to accuse the Cherokees of repeatedly corresponding
with the Mexicans, of receiving Mexican emissaries, entering into compacts with them and giving Ilcountenance to an insurrection raised in your
own vicinity by Mexicans." He advised Bowles that the final removal
of the Cherokees was certain. Whether it was done by war or by friendly
negotiations depended on the Indians themselevs.33
Indian Agent Martin Lacy, his son~in-Iaw, Dr. W. G. W. Jowers, an
interpreter named Cordray, and John H. Reagan delivered the letter to
Bowles. Reagan, who later became Postmaster General of the Confederacy,
was at this time a young tutor recently arrived from Tennessee. To his
eyes Bowles did not look like an Indian. He was somewhat tanned in
color, but he had neither the hair nor the eyes of an Indian. "His eyes
were gray, his hair was a dirty sandy colo!"; and his was an English head."
Bowles at the time was eighty-three years old but still vigorous and
strong.3i:
Bowles invited the delegation to a spring near his residence. 3 .5 They
seated themselves on a log, and Lamar's message was read and interpreted. Bowles told the white men that for some years he had been in
correspondence with John Ross, chief of the principal tribe of Cherokees,
with the idea of reuniting the two tribes and going to California out of
the reach of the whites. He asked if his people might have time to gather
their crops with that plan in mind. Lacy replied that he had no authority
except as stated in Lamar's letter. Bowles asked for time to consult with
his headmen, and Lacy agreed to return at a designated time for an an·
Bwer.
Reagan wrote in his memoirs that the conference made a deep impression on him for two reasons. liThe first was that neither the agent nor
the chief could read or write, except that Mr. Lacy could sign his name
mechanicallYj and neither could speak the language of the other. The
second was the frankness and dignity with which the negotiations were
carried on-neither tried to disguise his purpose nor to mislead the
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other."36 Although Reagan does not so state, he evidently attended the
conference in the rol~ of interpreter.
At the appointed time Reagan returned with Lacy for Bowles' answer.
Bowles stated that his young braves were in favor of war, that they believed that they could beat the whites. Bowles personally disagreed with
them. He believed that the whites would eventually win but not without
a long, bloody war. He said, however, that he would stand by his tribe.
If he fought, the whites would kill him, but if he did not, his own tribesmen would. Philosophically, he said that it mattered little to him because
he was old but that he felt great concern for his three wives and his children. "The council ended," says Reagan, "with the understanding that
war was to follow."31
Johnston ordered Edward Burleson, who had recently been appointed
a colonel of the regular army, to increase his force to four hundred men
3nd march from the western border to East Texas. At the same time
Johnston ordered Rusk in Nacogdoches "and Willis Landrnm in San Augustine to enlist additional volunteers. Lamar still hoped, however, that
a peaceful settlement could be arranged. He appointed as peace commissioners Johnston, David G. Burnet, I. W. Burton, Thomas J. Rusk, and
James S. Mayfield. He instructed them to go to Nacogdoches to supervise
the removal of the Cherokees. They were authorized to pay the Indians
compensation for crops, improvements, and other property that could not
be taken with them but not for the land. 38
Rusk, who had been elected Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Texas the previous December, had already led a body of volunteers to a
position facing the Cherokee camp when the other commissioner arrived at
the Neches River during the first week of July.39 While the peace com~
missioners attempted to negotiate, a curious agreement was made by the
two camps. A neutral line was drawn between them which neither was
to cross except under a flag of truce. They further agreed not to break
camp without due notice to the other. Reagan says that both sides were
stalling for time during this period-the Cherokees hoping for reinforcements from the Mexicans and plains Indians, and the Texans waiting for
the arrival of Burleson from the Colorado and Landrum from the Redlands.
Burleson arrived on July 14, and the Texans momentarily expected
the arrival of Landrum to bring their total force to about nine hundred
men. At this point a disagreement arose between the regulars and volunteers as to who would command the campaign. The regulars wanted Burleson, but the volunteers insisted on Rusk. Each general was willing for
the other to command, but neither would accept for fear of offending the
other. The stalemate was one which characteristically preceded battles
of the Texas Republic J and it pointed up the curious structure of the
Texas defense system.
Congress had enacted ample laws for the organization of a regular
army, a militia, and a ranger force. The ranger organization was designed for frontier service t 40 but neither the regular army nor militia ever
became an effective, dependable defense organization. Houston reduced
the regular army to a skeleton in the spring of 1837 when that army
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proved a threat to the civil government. Lamar attempted to revitalize the
regular force in early 1839 but with little success. Texans showed little
enthusiasm for the restrictions to their freedom which army life entailed.
Even the restrictions of regular militia duty repelled them.
Thus, most of the men who fought in the Texas-Cherokee War were
citizen volunteers who could not properly be called either regulars or militia. Many of them were settlers who volunteered because of the immediate danger to their homes. Others were the footloose element which
Adjutant General Hugh McLeod called "the floating chivalry which generally compose our volunteer corps."~l After the experience of the Cherokee campaign both McLeod and Secretary Johnston recommended a revision of the militia laws. Such official recommendations became a standard feature of governmental reports, but because of the sparse population,
lack of money, and lack of citizen interest, the militia was never organized effectively. Johnston solved the immediate problem during the Cherokee campaign by assuming command himself and appointing Kelsey H.
Douglass brigadier general. This was the only battle that Johnston per~
sonally directed until his final battle as a Confederate general at Shiloh.
The peace commissioners made their last attempt to negotiate on July
14. Bowles asked for more time, whereupon negotiations were broken off.
At sunrise the next morning Bowles' son rode into the Texas camp under
a flag of truce and, in accordance with the agreement, notified Johnston
that the Cherokees would break camp and move west of the Neches River.
Johnston informed him that the Texans would give pursuit. Young Bowles
was then escorted half a mile beyond the picketS. 42
About noon Johnston instructed Douglass to put the men in motion but
to give the Indians one more chance to accept peace terms before attack~
ing. Landrum, who had not yet arirved and who did not join the main
force until July 20, was sent orders to advance up the Neches. The regiments under Burleson and Rusk advanced toward the Cherokee camp and
upon finding it deserted followed the trail of the Indians. Later that
afternoon the Texans came upon the Indians in a strong position near a
Delaware village. "They were immediately attacked and beaten," Johnston reported. .The Indians retreated, leaving eighteen dead on the field
and taking their wounded with them.
The Texans feared that during the night the Indians would scatter
into marauding bands to attack frontier outposts. Johnston divided his
force to send scouts to warn the settlements. The next morning the main
body again took up the pursuit. They overtook the Cherokees in the
Neches bottom about fifteen miles west of the present Tyler near the
conjunction of the present Van Zandt, Henderson, and Smith Counties.
After a brisk battle which lasted for about an hour and a half, the Indians
retreated into a dense thicket. HThe action . . . was contested severely,
every period of the time, by the Indians, who clearly manifested they
aimed at a victory," said Douglass. "Their leaders were frequently heard
urging them to a charge."
Old Chief Bowles rode conspicuously along his line clad in a military
hat, silk vest, sword and sash which legend says Sam Houston had given
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him;l3 His horse was injured, and he was shot in the thigh, but he was
the last to leave the field. As he dismounted and started to walk away, a
Texan shot him in' the back. He fell, then pulled himself to sitting position, and turned to face his enemy. John H. Reagan ran forward in
an attempt to spare the old chief's life, but another Texan, Robert W.
Smith, fired the death shot.H •
Douglass estimated that the Cherokee force consisted of between seven
hundred and one thousand warriors. About one hundred of them were
killed in the battle. Johnston in a Jetter to the Telegraph and TezlUJ
Register shortly after the campaign estimated that the total Texas force
was about nine hundred. Of this number abo:ut five hundred participated
in the Battle of the Neches; the others were on detached service. Texan
losses in the campaign were relatively small, four listed as killed in action
and thirty~six wounded.
The Texans followed the remnants of the tribe for a week, destroying
their villages and cornfields, until the Cherokees dispersed never again to
Fose a threat to East Texas. On July 25, it was agreed that the enemy
had scattered and divided so that further pursuit was useless. Accordingly,
on that afternoon Johnston ordered the volunteers mustered out of service.
The associated tribes in the area agreed to accept payment for their im~
provements and to cross into the United States. Rusk and Mayfield were.
appointed commissioners to supervise that removal. The paymaster gen~
eral of the army estimated that the pay for the men under Douglass
amounted to $21,000. An additional $25,000 was allotted to pay for the
improvements of the Indians who agreed to leave.45
The casualty lists of the wear indicate clearly that the Cherokees were
no match for the Texans. The Cherokees were a semicivilized, agricultural
people who made effort after effort to secure legal title to their land.
For that reason their story is an especially tragic one. With one notable
exception, however, Texans of the period displayed scant compassion for
their antagonists. The cruel rule of survival of the fittest prevailed on
the frontier; and the frontiersman was never absolutely sure that he was
more fit than the Indian. Sentiments such as sympathy and compassion
were reserved for those far enough removed from the scene in time or
distance to afford such luxuries. The results of the Texas-Cherokee war
were hailed with satisfaction throughout Texas. East Texans honored
Rusk, Douglass, and Burleson as heroes, and Johnston was tendered 80
many public dinners he could not attend all of them. The number of men
claiming the distinction of having killed Bowles became a standing joke
in Nacogdoches.
Only Sam Houston of contemporary Texans vigorously protested the
fate of the Cherokees. He had been visitng in the United States during
the campaign, and he returned to Texas angry with those whom he con
sidered the instigators of it. He considered his treaty of February 23,
1836, as morally, if not legally. binding on Texas, and he had repeatedly
made a personal pledge to Bowles that the treaty would be honored. Houston attributed the war to the greediness of land speculators, especially
Burnet.
w
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One of Houston's major points in the defense of the Cherokees was
that there was no proof that they had been agreeable to Mexican offers
for an alliance. This is true, but it is also true that Mexican and Cherokee
interests ran along parallel lines in 1839. There is abundant proof that
Mexico hoped for an Indian alliance and courted the Cherokees' favor with
promises of land. Texans, on the other hand, ll.sde no effort to conciliate
the Cheroekes, having taken their stand by their refusal to approve the
Houston-Forbes treaty. The Cherokees were indeed unperceptive if they
failed to realize that their advantage lay with Mexico and to act accordingly. Perhaps the Texans exaggerated the danger of the Cherokees, and
undoubtedly the rich land of the Indians was a tempting prize. There
can be no doubt, however, that northeastern Texas was in a state of continual alarm beginning in the fall of 1835, and that settlers there considered the Cherokees a real threat to survival.
The only victory Houston won for the Cherokees was a moral one.
On February 1, 1840, Congress passed an act which provided that the
Cherokee lands would be divided into sections and sold. 4t1 The act had
aroused heated controversy in Texas because of a legal point it brought
up. If the Cherokees were not in legal possession of the land, then it fell
under the provisions of the general land act of the Republic. If they were
in legal possession, then the land was won from them in July 1839, and
it could not be disposed of under terms of the general land act. Houston
led the advocates of the act of February 1, 1840, and presented a heated
defense of the Cherokees and their legal right to the land. Passage of
the act was in effect a vindication of the Cherokees.
A still unswered question is whether in 1835 and early 1836 Sam Houston was acting as a citizen of Texas, of the United States, or of the Cherokee Nation. A popular theory is that he came to Texas to carry out
Andrew Jackson's designs, but the evidence is rather nebulous. If Houston
dreamed of a southwestern conquest, the dream was not an original one
but one which he shared with many others, including Aaron Burr. Certainly, his actions do not indicate that he intended to carry out a plan
of conquest. He settled in Nacogdoches near his old friends, the Cherokees, and he was a late comer to the Texas Revolution. Throughout his
career in the Texas. Republic he stubbornly discouraged filibustering
schemes. Llerena Friend, reviewing the evidence, concludes that Houston
came to Texas because he was a ruined man looking for .fresh opportu~
nity.41 She is undoubtedly correct. At the same time, his relation to the
Texas Cherokees is an intriguing one. He moved that the Consultation
guarantee the Cherokees their land. He negotiated the treaty which set
forth their rights. As Pl:esident he used all his influence in an effort to
put the treaty into effect. Whatever Houston's motives in coming to
Texas, he was a friend to the Cherokees.
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